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The Eurozone in Crisis:  
Origins and Prospects
By Menzie D. Chinn and Jeffry A. Frieden
The financial crisis gripping the eurozone countries seems incredibly complex, and although the reasons why their finances have come to grief are quite sim-
ple, the solution will not be easy. For the eurozone to resolve its crisis requires the 
political will to undertake painful measures, with serious distributional effects. As 
long as certain groups seek to avoid those costs, resolution of the crisis will be 
elusive.
The European financial crisis and the ensuing recession are of critical impor-
tance. The euro area is the world’s largest economy; its trajectory has a powerful 
impact on the fortunes of Asia and even the United States.  This effect is even 
stronger at a time when the world economy is so fragile. 
The eurozone crisis is the result of at least two key weaknesses in the original proj-
ect of European monetary integration. First, the common currency and its monetary 
policy were applied to a set of economies that were very different one from the other. 
In the lingo of economists, the original group of 12 nations—Austria, Belgium, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
and Spain—did not constitute an “optimal currency area.” (Greece joined in 2001 
between the euro’s establishment and introduction.) The countries were subject to 
too diverse a set of economic shocks. They were not sufficiently integrated, and they 
lacked a fiscal union that could smooth out those shocks, compensating hard-hit 
economies with transfers from better-performing economies. Further, with the euro 
in place, the monetary policy of the new European Central Bank proved to be too 
loose for some countries and too tight for others. 
The second weakness is that investors interpreted the creation of the union as an 
implicit guarantee of member countries’ government debt. It seemed clear that if a 
serious financial crisis erupted in one eurozone member country, the risks of con-
tagion to the rest of the zone and of a negative effect on the euro would force other 
countries to bail out the member in crisis. Investors believed this interpretation 
even though no such formal guarantees were made. These implicit guarantees were 
problematic because they pushed interest rates lower, which, in turn, gave govern-
ments, businesses, and households incentive to borrow more than they would have 
had they properly understood the risks. In other words, risk was underpriced due 
to the perception of an implicit guarantee. The result was that Europe, particularly 
Southern Europe, which experienced unnaturally low interest rates, borrowed far 
more than was sensible, and is now suffering from the resulting debt binge. And in 
certain countries, this problem of over-borrowing is compounded by a long-term 
problem of public spending on pensions and health care that has exceeded what the 
rate of economic growth made possible.
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In the past few months, U.S. debt and our 
structural deficit have made headlines, 
roiled markets, and left Congress and the 
president to scramble to find policy solu-
tions. Discussions of the deficit and the 
debt were highlighted during the July 2011 
legislative debate over raising the U.S. 
debt ceiling and again immediately follow-
ing Standard & Poor’s downgrade  
of the U.S. debt from its AAA status. 
The U.S. debt has grown dramatically  
since 2007 and, under reasonable policy  
scenarios, is expected to continue to  
grow. The reasons for the growth in debt  
vary. They include the 2001-2003 tax  
cuts,revenue declines in the wake of the  
recession and the slow recovery, and  
higher spending due to the bailouts, wars  
in Afghanistan and Iraq, and new domestic 
spending initiatives. Andrew Reschovsky  
discusses these issues and more in this  
Director’s Perspective
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In the next section, we review the origins of the euro proj-
ect. We then recount the ideas that underpinned the project 
and explain why some economists were skeptical. The current 
state of debate over possible solutions is next. We conclude 
with some views on the likely path forward.
The Origins of the Euro Project
The creation of the euro—formally the completion of 
Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)—is the lat-
est step in a long process of politically motivated economic 
integration. In the wake of World War II, political leaders of 
the main European countries sought to bind the economies 
of the former antagonists. First they established the European 
Coal and Steel Council, which harmonized trade in these crit-
ical commodities. This led to the 1956 creation of the Euro-
pean Economic Community, which, in principle, established 
a common market wherein goods were free to move across 
borders. This was quite an accomplishment, given that these 
countries had been at war a few years earlier.
After the breakdown of the fixed exchange rate system of 
Bretton Woods in 1971, the Europeans sought to minimize 
the variability of intra-Europe exchange rates. Central banks 
committed to intervening—by buying and selling foreign 
exchange—to achieve that aim. There was some modest suc-
cess, especially after the 1979 establishment of the European 
Monetary System, which attempted to link other European 
Union (EU) member currencies to the Deutsche mark. After 
1985, the system included most EU members and some non-
members.
In 1992, EU members agreed to a program of economic 
and monetary union, the culmination of which would be 
the creation of a common currency called the euro and man-
aged by the European Central Bank. The plan envisioned a 
multi-stage process toward this single currency. First, there 
would be a period of tight management by central banks so 
that currency values did not vary more than 3 percent from 
target, or “par,” values. Finally, the currency values would, 
under the careful management of individual central banks, 
converge toward the final conversion rates, established by 
common agreement. Along the way, authorities would have 
to bring inflation down to a sufficiently low level so that the 
rates did not diverge substantially. In addition, the agreement 
required that, as a share of GDP, national budget deficits not 
exceed 3 percent, and government debt not exceed 60 percent 
(most countries failed to abide by these 
conditions). Despite the European Mon-
etary System crises of 1992 and 1993, 
during which many member currencies 
were devalued or deviated from the par 
values by more than the allowed amounts 
(and Britain dropped out completely), 
the euro was put in place on January 1, 
1999. The physical currency was rolled 
out in 2001. The eurozone eventually 
expanded to its 17 members.
Menzie Chinn is a professor of public 
affairs and economics at the La Follette 
School of Public Affairs at the University 
of Wisconsin–Madison. Jeffry Frieden is a 
professor at Harvard University’s Depart-
ment of Government. They wrote the book 
Lost Decades: The Making of America’s 
Debt Crisis and the Long Recovery, pub-
lished by W.W. Norton & Co. in 2011.
The Economic Calculus of the Euro 
To comprehend the eurozone’s difficulties, one must under-
stand the economic logic of a currency union. In what is 
called the “optimal currency area” literature, Robert Mundell, 
Ronald McKinnon, and Peter Kenen laid out the conditions 
under which having a common currency makes sense for 
countries.
Having many currencies is bothersome and costly. The 
practice requires keeping track of many prices—after all, an 
exchange rate is essentially the price of foreign currency. But 
that price happens to fluctuate a lot minute by minute, day 
by day. In addition, when one is thinking about long-term 
projects such as investing across borders, this volatility can be 
very costly. The associated risk impedes the flow of goods and 
capital across borders. Currency unification produces sub-
stantial benefits, in particular by encouraging trade and finan-
cial integration. In the context of the EU’s continuing quest 
for greater economic integration, a currency union appeared 
to be a logical next step.
However, a flexible exchange rate allows governments 
to adjust policy to changes in economic conditions. The 
exchange rate thus serves as a sort of macroeconomic “shock 
absorber.” For instance, if demand for American cars decreas-
es, a weakening of the dollar, which makes American cars 
cheaper for foreigners, can help offset the negative impact on 
the economy. Fixing one’s exchange rate to a certain value 
or, at the extreme, giving up one’s currency, eliminates that 
shock absorber. A transnational currency requires a nation’s 
government to give up one of the most powerful tools of mac-
roeconomic policy.
When do the benefits of an independent currency out-
weigh the costs? The answer depends on a lot of variables. 
However, some insights can be gleaned from an example. 
Consider Wisconsin and the rest of the United States. One 
could argue that if Wisconsin had its own currency, when 
demand for Wisconsin cheese fell, the Wisconsin dollar could 
lose value so that some of that demand could be made up 
by selling the cheese at a lower price (in U.S. dollars). But 
those sales would incur the cost of converting currency for 
each transaction, and indeed for every cross-border transac-
tion, including those for banking and finance, as well as other 
goods and services.
Now, if Wisconsin and all the other states in the Unit-
ed States produced cheese (or an identical bundle of goods 
and services), then each state economy 
would be subject to the same shocks, 
and the argument for a monetary union 
would be stronger.
In the Wisconsin-U.S. case, being 
part of a monetary union make sense 
for two additional reasons. The first is 
that Wisconsin is part of a “fiscal union” 
that the federal government manages. 
Members of the U.S. fiscal union share 
the risks. When Wisconsin experiences a 
downturn, federally funded net transfers 
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(unemployment insurance, reduced tax payments) increase, 
partially offsetting the negative impact. The second reason 
that monetary union works well for Wisconsin is that labor 
mobility is fairly high in the United States. When economic 
conditions deteriorate in Wisconsin, out-migration to the rest 
of the country increases, while in-migration decreases. Unem-
ployment is less volatile with this “escape valve.” 
A long-established U.S. policy is that the federal govern-
ment will not “bail out” states that run into financial diffi-
culties. This situation means that states with different fiscal 
positions are often charged different interest rates by finan-
cial markets. In the eurozone, investors’ belief that a bailout 
would be forthcoming if a member state got into trouble con-
siderably loosened European borrowing constraints. 
The argument that the euro area countries did not con-
stitute an optimal currency area was well known prior to 
economic and monetary union. In a series of 1994 papers, 
economists Tamim Bayoumi and Barry Eichengreen mea-
sured the extent to which the shocks hitting the eurozone 
economies were different; they established that only a few 
economies could be construed to fit the requirements of sym-
metric shocks (the Northern European countries, within the 
eventual eurozone). 
Of course, these conditions are not immutable. Since 
the late 1990s, the steady flow of edicts from EU headquar-
ters in Brussels and the European economic plan known as 
the Lisbon agenda issued by the EU’s European Council 
in 2000, sought to make individual economies more flex-
ible and increase cross-country mobility of labor. Increas-
ing trade integration (which would tend to be one result 
of reducing exchange rate volatility) would also make the 
effects of asymmetric shocks less pronounced. In addi-
tion, currency union seemed desirable to many as a way of 
encouraging further integration within Europe; if it had a 
(perhaps temporary) cost, that price might be worth paying. 
Finally, groups in the EU strongly favored Economic and 
Monetary Union because it promised to provide them with 
powerful benefits—firms and industries with major cross-
border economic interests particularly stood to gain. For 
them, whatever problems Economic and Monetary Union 
might cause for the EU as a whole were counter-balanced by 
the positive impact.
While trade integration increased dramatically in the wake 
of Economic and Monetary Union, labor mobility did not 
increase sufficiently. While professionals can move without 
too much difficulty, lower skilled workers faced considerable 
impediments to relocation. In addition, cultural and linguis-
tic ties seem to exert a substantial pull, keeping cross border 
labor flows small, by comparison to U.S. levels.
Why did the problems come to a head in the wake of the 
global financial crisis? First, from 1999 to 2007, following 
the euro’s introduction, the eurozone faced a fairly benign 
economic environment. Whatever nationally specific eco-
nomic developments took place were not so serious as to call 
into question the integrity of the eurozone as an economic 
unit. Second, as shown in Figure 1, the implicit guarantees 
associated with Economic and Monetary Union drove down 
interest rates toward German levels—even for the countries 
such as Greece that arguably had poorer fiscal prospects—
and encouraged more borrowing, a situation that fed upon 
Figure 1: European Sovereign Interest Rates, 10-Year Maturity
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A prefatory statement: Greece is not the problem; it is too 
small to have a regionwide impact. However, Spain and Italy 
are much more serious situations. In this light, the proposal 
for stricter fiscal requirements is nothing more than window 
dressing to assuage popular criticism of bailouts. 
The only viable options are the following:
u Continued austerity measures.
u Northern European transfers to the Southern 
European countries, directly or in the form of 
the restructuring of Southern European debts to 
the detriment of Northern European creditors.
u Breakup of the Economic and Monetary Union 
and a complete or partial dissolution of the 
eurozone.
The first option is pretty much current policy. Although 
there is talk of voluntary debt write-downs for Greece, this 
policy is not on the table for the other problem eurozone 
countries. But the austerity measures required to hit the 
targets envisioned by the pact agreed to in 2011 will only 
exacerbate the incipient eurozone-wide recession (thus mak-
ing the targets even harder to achieve). At some juncture, at 
much greater cost in terms of unemployment and lost out-
put, the debts will be eventually written down. The private 
sector will bear some of the cost, as will the creditor govern-
ments. The apportionment of costs is the problem, and the 
attempts to shift the burden will delay resolution. As a con-
sequence, the total cost will be much larger, so, in this case, 
the game is negative sum, not zero sum. 
The downside risk is great. A prolonged period of eco-
nomic stagnation is not to be taken lightly; the years between 
the first and second world wars stand testament to the fact 
that such conditions lead to social unrest and dangerous 
political upheavals.
From our perspective, it is important to understand that 
large net transfers from Germany and other Northern Euro-
pean states to the periphery countries will result in a more 
rapid resumption of growth. The transfer takes place by way 
of a bigger bailout fund, financed by the surplus countries, 
and a bigger reduction in debt loads via write-downs. In cer-
tain countries, social welfare spending programs will require 
larger, more comprehensive, reforms than in others. Clearly, 
this situation is true in Greece. It is also true in Italy. 
Spending cuts will not be enough; spurring long-term 
growth is equally important—perhaps more important, in 
the case of Italy. But whether a similar prescription for Ire-
land would be productive at all is unclear. The likelihood of 
success would be greater if the European Central Bank was to 
ease liquidity concerns, as it has started to do, by purchasing 
large amounts of government bonds—the European equiva-
lent of quantitative easing.
However, European Central Bank actions along these 
lines is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition. In our 
view, the bank has to address the key problem associated 
with the eurozone: the lack of an exchange rate adjustment 
mechanism. Exchange rate changes facilitate shifts in relative 
prices. In the absence of exchange rate changes, alterations 
itself in a proverbial “self-reinforcing loop.” The credit boom 
papered over problems. 
In this sense, the apparent “disappearance of risk” in the 
eurozone paralleled the similar phenomenon in the United 
States. In the eurozone, the underpricing of risk resulted in 
excess borrowing by households, firms, and governments 
and in commensurate capital flows from Northern European 
countries to Southern European countries. In the United 
States, the private sector borrowed excessively, pulling in 
record capital inflows—manifesting in record current account 
deficits, as we reported in our 2011 book, Lost Decades.
When the global recession of 2008-09 struck, most euro-
zone governments went further into deficit, as social wel-
fare and unemployment benefit payments increased and tax 
revenues collapsed. In some cases, the problem, which the 
recession aggravated, was a structural deficit associated with 
overgenerous social spending and insufficient tax collection. 
This scenario applies most profoundly to Greece. To a certain 
extent, it applies also to Italy, although a slow trend growth 
is driving the debt dynamics there. However, the character-
ization of excess public spending does not pertain to all the 
problem eurozone countries. 
For instance, Ireland, in contrast, was a paragon of fiscal 
rectitude on paper. In the midst of a boom in financial and 
housing markets, the Irish government ran budget surplus-
es. With the financial crisis, the government implemented 
a complete bank deposit guarantee and subsequently bailed 
out major banks, resulting in massive increases in the govern-
ment’s debt. Similarly, Spain was running a budget surplus 
—until the collapse of its housing market.
The phenomenon of hidden government liabilities sud-
denly showing up at the onset of a crisis is not new. In fact, 
the East Asian crises of the 1990s brought to the fore the con-
cept of “contingent liabilities.” A government can look like it’s 
in an enviable fiscal situation, when in fact the government 
is on the hook for massive debts, because it cannot allow a 
banking system to become insolvent. 
This point highlights the linkage of the banking system 
debt problem with the sovereign debt problem. Portions of 
the banking system are insolvent. In the case of the United 
States, the federal government had the resources to bail out 
the financial system without seriously endangering its ability 
to borrow. In the eurozone, because some countries’ govern-
ments already had high debt loads, the additional borrowing 
associated with bank bailouts would only make the sovereign 
debt problem worse. 
Clearly, the problem countries need additional resources 
from outside—either from multilateral institutions or other 
eurozone countries, a reduction in their burdens, or both. 
This condition is unavoidable for a resolution of the crisis.
Possible Solutions
Experts have made innumerable proposals for solving the 
eurozone debt crisis. But once one understands that solution 
requires a net transfer of resources, then the set of options is 
reduced considerably.
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of relative prices have to take place via nominal price chang-
es. When wages are what have to fall, the process can be a 
long, drawn-out affair, associated with persistent and elevated 
unemployment. A tacit acceptance of a higher target infla-
tion rate (which would allow faster adjustments in real wages) 
would facilitate adjustment to full employment—and would 
more rapidly erode the real debt burden faced by the debtor 
countries. 
The idea that the Northern European countries can avoid 
these net transfers is a chimera. If the transfers do not occur 
by way of an orderly debt write-down, they will be effect-
ed by outright debt defaults. The resulting social and eco-
nomic costs will likely be much larger than any coordinated 
approach.
The third option, a complete or partial breakup of the 
eurozone, might prove to be less costly than either of the pre-
vious two choices. However, tremendous uncertainty is asso-
ciated with this path. Although a breakup would allow for 
adjustments of exchange rates in a way that would lead to a 
faster recovery, the resulting chaos associated from litigating 
all the trillions of euros worth of contracts could far outweigh 
those benefits. Hence, this option has so much downside risk 
that it cannot be contemplated.  Sad to say, the current  politi-
cal paralysis in Europe’s capitals has increased the possibility 
of such a catastrophic outcome.
Looking Ahead
What are the prospects for a positive outcome? While we 
hope for the early recognition of the need for North-South 
transfers, recapitalization of the banking system, and acceler-
ated inflation, our observation of the political process makes 
us pessimistic. Thus far, electorates in the creditor countries 
do not seem to be convinced that transfers are necessary. As 
long as this characterization  holds true, progress toward a 
true solution will be elusive.
Much more likely will be a process of lurching from one 
crisis to temporary palliative to the next crisis. In that sce-
nario, recovery will be years off.  u
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